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Following Rosen [1981], superstar effects (earnings convex in quality and a few firms reaping a 
large share of market earnings) occur with imperfect substitution between sellers, low (and 
possibly declining) marginal cost of output, and marginal cost falling as quality increases. 
However, markets without such characteristics have superstar effects, and the main result from 
the superstar model---small quality differences result in large earnings differences---may not 
hold. A competitive model can yield superstar effects when a few firms have quality 
significantly higher than others and cost increases in output, provided cost does not increase too 
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INTRODUCTION 
  In his 1981 paper, Sherwin Rosen was the first to formally analyze the phenomenon of 
what he called superstars. Rosen assumed more talented individuals produce higher quality 
products. Assuming, for simplicity of discussion, individual talent and product quality are 
identical, superstar effects imply earnings are convex in quality, the highest quality producers 
earn a disproportionately large share of  market earnings, and the possibility of only a few sellers 
in the market. Rosen argued superstar effects were the result of two phenomena: 1) imperfect 
substitution among products, with demand for higher quality increasing more than proportionally 
so small differences in talent may result in large earnings differences, and 2) technology such 
that one or a few sellers could profitably satisfy market demand, with higher quality producers 
having lower marginal cost of output. In the extreme case, we have a joint good, where an 
additional buyer can be serviced at little additional cost to the seller. Borghans and Groot [1998] 
refer to a market with such cost conditions as one with “media stars.” Rosen [1983] argued such 
markets almost always require mass media, and, depending on the distribution of consumer 
preferences, may contain only a few sellers. Television shows and recorded music are examples 
of media markets.  
However, imperfect substitution and joint consumption do not characterize all markets in 
which superstar effects appear. For example, Krueger [2005] identifies significant superstar 
effects for music concerts in the U.S.---effects that have become even larger in recent years. He 
reports revenue for music concerts from 1982 to 2003. Most of the artists would fall under the 
heading of rock music, but other artists are included.
1 In 1982, the top 5% (in terms of revenue) 
of artists earned 62% of concert revenue. For 2003, the corresponding figure was 84%. Note, 
larger superstar effects for music concerts do not necessarily imply either less substitutability   3
among products or technological changes favoring mass media. Krueger suggests these effects 
result from changes in pricing due to concerts and recorded music becoming weaker 
complements. Further, Krueger argues the time and effort for a live performance of a song 
should not have changed much over time. It is also unlikely the cost of performing a song 
depends significantly on the quality of the musicians. The technology of reaching more buyers 
for a live performance is much different than it is for selling additional CDs. As Rosen noted: “It 
is preferable to hear concerts in a hall of moderate size rather than in Yankee Stadium.”
2 Quality 
of live performances is significantly diluted by audience size [Rosen, 1983], and cost thus 
increases in market size.
3 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how superstar effects may occur in markets 
absent imperfect substitution and joint consumption. There are several differences between our 
model and the typical superstar model. First, imperfect substitution is not required. Superstar 
effects result because a few sellers have quality significantly higher than other sellers. One 
apparent advantage of Rosen’s [1981] model is superstars may occur even when quality 
differences between superstars and others are small. This is because the joint good nature of 
production in his model allows one seller to satisfy additional buyers at little additional cost. 
Thus, even if a seller’s quality is viewed as only slightly higher than that of another, everyone is 
still able to buy from the higher quality seller. However, Adler [2006] notes Rosen’s model may 
not result in relatively high profit for supposed superstars unless there are significant quality 
differences between sellers. If several sellers of similar quality exist, and marginal cost declines 
with firm output, Adler argues firms will compete and drive price towards average cost. If the 
high quality seller’s product is valued only slightly more than that of the low quality seller, even 
if marginal and average cost are negatively related to quality, a small quality difference implies   4
the higher quality seller’s price will be only slightly above average cost (since price is competed 
down to average cost of the lower quality seller, which is only slightly greater than average cost 
of the higher quality seller). Thus, one “superstar” may survive and sell most, if not all of market 
output, but it will not earn significant economic profit.  
Second, marginal cost need not decline in output and quality. We assume marginal cost 
increases in output, and, although superstar effects are more pronounced if marginal cost is 
inversely related to quality, such effects may occur even if marginal cost increases in quality.
4                              
  Third, competition occurs in the model because there are many potential and active firms, 
most of which have the lowest quality level, and none of which sells a significant share of market 
output. In Rosen’s superstar model, price depends on a seller’s output. The threat of entry and 
the assumption sellers of similar quality are good substitutes force firms to behave competitively. 
However, as discussed above, with declining marginal and average cost, such competition would 
eliminate one of the superstar effects, the high level of profit for such sellers. Also, if stars are 
very scarce, potential entrants are likely to be of the lowest quality. Thus, in the Rosen model, 
small quality differences may imply no large earnings for “superstars,” but large quality 
differences suggest a lack of competition. Our model has price-taking producers, and, because 
marginal cost increases with output, those with a large quality advantage over other firms will 
produce only a small percentage of market output, another feature of a competitive market.  
  We assume there are many potential sellers of the lowest quality called non-stars. Since 
some firms could have quality only slightly greater than that of the lowest level of quality, it 
seems a bit extreme to refer to such firms as superstars. Thus, herein all firms with quality above 
the lowest level will be referred to as stars. Stars can not be created, unlike non-stars who exist 
in relatively large numbers. For example, it is easy to put together a musical group that is   5
comparable to many other groups, but the determination of what groups are high quality is at the 
whim of consumers.  
  Since the concept of superstar effects is well established, superstar will still be used to 
denote the phenomena of revenue and profit increasing and convex in quality, and a few sellers 
earning a large percentage of market revenue and profit. Rosen [1981] used profit when 
considering superstar effects, but we use both revenue and profit. Profit is not used exclusively 
for the following reasons. In our model, low quality producers earn zero profit. Thus, stars 
always earn all market profit. Also, in our model, as in the special case in Rosen [1981, pp. 851-
’52] closest to our model, revenue and profit are identically affected by quality. Further, earnings 
reported for top performers in entertainment are not net of cost. The data on concert earnings 
from Krueger [2005] considered below involve revenue. 
The assumption herein is quality levels are perfect substitutes.
5 With free entry, a large 
number of potential producers with low quality, and full arbitrage between quality levels, a 
competitive market results without Rosen’s assumptions of potential entry by (super)stars and 
sellers having similar quality levels. Becker and Murphy [2000] note competition and free entry 
yield a price equal to the marginal and average cost of new units, implying superstar effects can 
not result in such a world. However, higher quality sellers can sell at higher prices and earn 
positive economic profit if free entry is at the lowest quality level.   
  Besides the case of music concerts, discussed above, other examples of growing superstar 
effects exist. Consider the market for best-selling books [Sorensen, 2006]. From the mid-1980s 
to the mid-1990s, the share of books sold in the U.S. by the top thirty authors nearly doubled. By 
1994, 70% of all fiction sales were accounted for by four authors: Clancy, Crichton, Grisham, 
and King. Another example is in the market for dentists in the U.S. Frank and Cook [1995] find   6
the number of U.S. dentists who make more than $120,000 per year (in 1989 dollars) increased 
by 78% from 1979 to 1989, while the number of dental specialists (surgeons, orthodontists, etc.) 
produced each year was basically unchanged, the total number of dentists declined slightly, and 
average real dental earnings  increased only slightly. Real earnings of the highest paid dentists 
tripled over this period, and dentistry is clearly not a media market. Frank and Cook cite one 
possible explanation (offered by the editor of the Journal of Dental Education) which is the 
increased demand for cosmetic dentistry, a high value service. Such a change implies an 
increased gap between the value consumers place on high and low quality dental services, and 
growing superstar effects even if the dentistry market is competitive. 
  One question we do not address is why some are viewed as higher quality than others. 
Becker and Murphy [2000] offer one reason for the existence of stars in what they call social 
markets. They argue some (followers) gain acceptance and prestige by emulating the 
consumption of others (leaders). Whatever the reason for the existence of stars, technological 
advances in recent years may have caused the perceived quality of stars in some sectors to 
increase. Products such as Walkman, Discman, and iPod enable consumers to listen to music 
virtually anywhere. If the music market is indeed “social,” the ability of followers to emulate 
leaders would have increased, implying an increase in consumers’ valuation of higher quality 
products. We simply equate higher quality with a higher willingness to pay for the product by 
consumers. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the competitive superstar 
model is developed. Numerical examples of superstar effects are considered in Section 3. Section 
4 contains a discussion of recent changes in ticket prices for music concerts. Concluding remarks 
are presented in Section 5.                                             7
                                    
THE MODEL 
Consumers  
 Consider  an  individual who maximizes utility, U. Let U = U(∑     , x), where x is a good 
with a price of one, and yi represents the amount consumed of each good of quality zi. The form 
of the utility function implies the individual goods (excluding the good measured by x) are 
perfect substitutes.  Income = I, so, with pi the price of good “i,” the budget constraint is  
I = ∑      + x. Substituting in U() for x using the budget constraint, an individual maximizes 
U(∑     , I-∑     ). For an interior solution for any good, we have with U1 the derivative of U 




   
 = zi U1 – pi U2 = 0.                                                                                                      








 .                                                                                                                              
 
  Thus, arbitrage must occur in the market if there is to be an interior solution for given 
quality levels. Without the condition in eq.(2), y = 0 for some quality levels. If, for example, for 
quality “zi,” zi/pi exceeded the corresponding ratio for other quality levels, only quality level zi 
would be purchased. Thus, in order to sell, and to do so at the lowest possible price, a producer 
of a particular quality level is forced to adjust its price according to eq.(2). 
  Since, given arbitrage, an individual is indifferent to the quality levels consumed, we can 
not derive demand for an individual quality level. We can only consider demand for some   8
aggregate of the different quality levels. Since, on average, consumers will buy the average 
quality level offered for sale,
6   , we consider a consumer maximizing utility given a good of 
average quality. 
   Suppose we have U = (  y)
 + x. With p and y price and quantity for a good of average 
quality, the budget constraint now I = py + x, the first-order condition for y yields: 
  y =  
 
   
 
  . With m identical consumers, market demand = Q = m 
 
   
 
  .  Solving for 
p, we have the market demand price: 
 
(3)  p




.                                                                                                              
 
 Define  A  /m
-1. Note: price inversely related to quantity requires  < 1. Thus, we have: 
 
(4)  p
D = A  Q
-1       
                                                                                                               
  Now arbitrage will yield the price of a particular quality level: pi = 
  
   p
D. As an example, 
suppose  = ½ and A and Q are such that AQ
-1 = $10. Now p
D = $10   . If     = 2,  
p
D = $10√2   $14.14. No one need actually buy a unit of quality level 2 in this case, but this is 
of no consequence. If, for example, one buys a unit of the good with z = 1, arbitrage tells us  
p1 = ½ p(  ) = $7.07. Now suppose average quality in the market rises, which, by eq.(4), tells us 
demand will increase, increasing the price for average quality, p
D. If    = 3,  
p
D = $10√3   $17.32. Now, for z = 1, p1 = [1/3]p(  ), so p1  $5.774.     9
 With   < 1, the price of a good of average quality increases in average quality at a 
decreasing rate. Since arbitrage requires a linear relation between the prices of different quality 
levels, an increase in average quality lowers the price for each quality level. As seen in sub-
section 2.4, low quality sellers will be tend to be driven out of the market as    increases unless 
the relation between quality and cost is significantly positive. 
   
Producers 
Consider a market in which talent is labeled as quality, z. We assume quality is intrinsic 
and is not diluted as output increases. Since marginal cost is assumed to increase in output, no 
firm will produce a large percentage of market output. In contrast, in media markets, one or a 
few sellers may produce a large percentage of market output. Suppose there is a mass of sellers 
at the lowest quality level, z0. Free entry and exit of these non-stars occur. In contrast, stars have 
quality greater than z0, are relatively scarce, and are only created when consumer tastes dictate 
individual sellers are stars. Thus, the number of stars only changes exogenously in response to 
changes in consumer evaluations of the quality of sellers. All stars are in the market; there is no 
mass of stars ready to enter the market in response to positive profit.  
As discussed before, the assumption herein is quality levels are perfect substitutes. Thus, 
arbitrage yields relative prices. In order to determine actual price levels, suppose each firm has a 
typical U-shaped average cost curve. Now entry and exit of non-stars will force the long-run 
price of the lowest quality level, z0, to equal the height of the minimum point of average cost, P0. 
For any arbitrary quality z, arbitrage then implies:   
 
(5)  P(z) = zP0/z0.   10
 
  In general, the effect of quality on cost can be positive, zero, or negative. Thus, total cost 
for a firm, C, is given by:  
 
(6)  C = z
q
 + F,                                                                                                                    
 
where  > 1, q = the firm’s output, and F = fixed cost. A firm is a price taker: P is independent 




P , profit, , is given by: 
  
(7)   = kzq - z
q
 - F.                                                                                                            
 
Cost and superstar effects 
  Consider what cost conditions are necessary for superstar effects to occur when cost 
depends on quality.   
 
Proposition One. Given the assumed cost function,(eq.(6)), with marginal cost increasing in 
output ( > 1), revenue and profit increase and are convex in quality even if total cost increases 
in product quality, as long as it does so at a decreasing rate ( < 1). 
 
Proof. Using eq.(7), find the profit-maximizing choice of q, substitute the result into R 
and , and differentiate q, R, and  with respect to z. Let the profit-maximizing values of q, R, 
and   be denoted by q*, R*, and *, respectively. 
    11
 (8)  , q z kz
q
0
1   

    

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 Note,  with   > 1 (marginal cost increasing in output),  >  is necessary for R* and * to 
be positive functions of z. From eqs.(12) - (16), with  > 1 and  < 1, the  
profit-maximizing q is positively related to z, and both R* and * increase and are convex in z. 
Thus, a superstar effect can exist if cost increases with z at a decreasing rate. If  = 0, cost is   12
independent of z, and, if  < 0, C is inversely related to z. Clearly, for  < 1, the smaller is ,  the 





 , that is, the more convex R* and * are.  
  
  It is not possible to replicate the results above using a general relation between cost and 
quality. However, with a simple, specific relation between cost and output, and a general relation 
between cost and quality, it can be demonstrated (see the Appendix) a positive but diminishing 
effect of quality on cost may not be necessary and is not sufficient for revenue to be positively 
related to and convex in quality. 
 
Exogenous changes in the number of stars  
Proposition Two. An influx of stars (due to changes in consumer tastes) that raises z  will tend to 
cause non-stars to leave the market.  
 
Proof. Unlike non-stars, potential stars who would enter when comparable firms earn 
positive profit do not generally exist. However, consumers may now deem some previous non-
stars to be stars, which is equivalent to an exogenous increase in the number of stars. With a 




  < 1 in order to have downward 
sloping demand. In that case, if new stars cause     to increase, demand increases vertically by a 
smaller percentage than z  increased. Additionally, the market equilibrium price for average 
quality, P(  ),  increases by a smaller percentage because i) supply is not vertical, and ii) supply 
increased. Thus P(  ) <  
  
  
  , or 
  
   P(  ) < P0. However, arbitrage requires P(z0) =  
  
   P(  ), so 
P(z0) < P0, which means non-stars earn negative profit. Some non-stars will exit,
7 decreasing 
market supply, but also raising z  and thus increasing market demand. Both the demand increase   13
and supply decrease will raise P(  ), and this process will continue until P(z0) = P0 and non-stars 
earn zero profit.
8  
Additional stars with average quality below    would cause a reduction in P(  ) initially, 
since demand would decrease along with the increase in supply. The result could then be the 
same as in the previous paragraph: non-stars would exit until P(  ) increased sufficiently so   
P(z0) = P0.
9   
                                                                                                     
 The model with specific parameter values 
In order to consider how a competitive market might look, explicit functions for a firm’s 
cost and for market demand are used. Using eq.(6), since we are interested in demonstrating 
superstar effects when marginal cost is not inversely related to quality and output, it is assumed 
total cost is independent of quality ( = 0), and total variable cost is simply the square of output 
( = 2): C = q
2 + F. Entry and exit will force P(z0) equal to the height of the minimum point of 
average cost. At this point, q = F
1/2, and the height of average cost equals 2F
1/2  P0.  
As a price taker, a firm maximizes   by setting marginal cost equal to price, so            
q(z) = zP0/2z0, with the lowest quality sellers (z = z0) producing q = q0 = P0/2.  Additionally, to 
simplify the derivations, from eq.(4), assume   = ½, so inverse market demand becomes:                                     
 
(17)  p




.                                                                                                                  
 
  Suppose we have two types of sellers: stars, of whom there are s, and non-stars, of whom 
there are n. Since stars each produce qStar = zP0/2z0, and non-stars each produce q0 = P0/2, then   14
average quality is:     
 
(18)          
             
          
.                                                                                                                          
  
Using the arbitrage condition (eq.(5)) with z =   , and inverse market demand (eq.(17)), total 
demand is:
10   
 
(19)  Q =  
   
  
 
   
   .                                                                                                                                  
 
   Total supply is: 
 
(20) Q  = 
  
        
 
   . 
 
Using market demand and supply, we have: 
 
(21) (P0)





 ).                                                                                     
 
  Given values for z, z0, s, P0, and A, we can use eqs.(18) and (21) to determine the number 
of non-stars in the market, and star’s share of total output and revenue. We do this in the next 
section.          
     
NUMERICAL VALUES OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM   15
  As discussed in the introduction, for music concerts, Krueger [2005] finds the top 5% (in 
terms of revenue) of artists earned 62% of U.S. concert revenue in 1982 and 84% of concert 
revenue in 2003. Also, Figure 2 in Krueger [2005] shows artists with the highest ticket prices had 
prices more than three times the $40 plus average for recent years. To see if the competitive 
model developed herein can generate similar results, consider two numerical examples using 
eqs.(18) and (20). The numerical values were chosen for their simplicity, constrained by 
choosing the number of stars (s) such that stars would represent only a small percentage of the 
total number of producers (as is the case with music concerts). 
 
Example One. Let z = s = 5, P0 = z0 = $1, A = $10. 
 Let     = the average price of goods sold (weighted by quantities) = P(   . We now derive 
the long run equilibrium       using eq.(18). That is, we solve for the average price given the types 
and number of each type of sellers that are active. Using eq.(18), we solve eq.(20) for n, and then 
find other variables. We have n = 75,    =     = $2, P(z) = $5, P(z)/     = 2.5, q0 = .5, qStar = 2.5, 
total output from non-stars = 37.5, and total output from stars = 12.5. Stars represent 6.25% of all 
firms, sell 25% of Q, and earn 62.5% of market TR. 
 
Example Two. Let z = 6, s = 4, P0 = z0 = $1, and A = $10.  
 Now  n = 54.73,    =     = 2.52, P(z) = $6, P(z)/     = 2.38, q0 = .5, qStar = 3, total output of 
non-stars = 27.3765, and total output of stars = 12. Stars represent 6.8% of all firms, sell 30.5% 
of Q,  and earn 72.5% of market TR.
11 
    16
  Example One yields stars’ share of total revenue almost exactly that for music concerts in 
1982, albeit for the top 6.25%  (versus the top 5%) of earners. Example Two demonstrates the 
importance of relative star quality in terms of stars’ share of market output and revenue. 
Compared to Example One, Example Two has 20% fewer firms, but stars quality rises by 20%. 
Stars’ share of market output rises by 22%, and their share of market revenue rises by 16%. Even 
with fewer stars, the increase in quality of stars drives up demand, but, similar to an influx of 
stars (Proposition Two), this increase in  star quality reduces the number of non-stars in the 
market, despite the fact we also reduced the number of stars. The reason total revenue rises fairly 
rapidly as quality increases in this model is simple: both price and output are linear in quality. 
 
TICKET PRICES FOR ROCK CONCERTS 
Krueger [2005] found the average U.S. concert ticket price increased almost five times as 
fast (82% versus 17%) as the U.S. Consumer Price Index from 1996 to 2003. Also, the top 
performers sold fewer tickets over this period.
12 Krueger’s explanation for these effects is based 
on a monopoly model. The introduction of zero-price music downloads during this period (i.e. 
Napster) suggests concerts and purchased CDs are not as strongly complementary as before. 
Thus, the absolute value of the (negative) cross-price elasticity of demand between concert  
ticket prices and purchased music CDs would have declined. This would induce a monopolist to 
charge a higher price for concerts, and to reduce the quantity of concert tickets sold.  
  A competitive model of rock music can also explain the recent increase in concert prices. 
Suppose a seller produces both rock concerts and music CDs, and is a price taker in both 
markets. However, the price for concert tickets depends negatively on the price of a seller’s 
recorded music consumers listen to, whether from CDs or internet downloads, if concerts and   17
recorded music are complements. Let the amount of a seller’s recorded music consumed equal , 
with the price of  equal to P. Then the price a seller of quality z can charge for a concert ticket 
is P(z,P), and 
    ,  
  
 < 0. If a large percentage of recorded music consumed is now available at 
a zero price, the effective P  to buyers is reduced significantly. Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 
[2007] claim downloads have almost no effect on CD sales. However, Leibowitz [2003] argues 
there is a reduction in sales of  CDs of one unit for every five to six downloads. If P  has been 
reduced significantly, then P(z,P) should have increased. Thus, either competition or monopoly 
could explain an increase in concert ticket prices. However, the competitive model does not 
predict a decline in output for stars, so some monopoly power may be present in the market for 
music groups. 
  An alternative explanation for the decline in output (that is, fewer concerts performed) by 
stars involves the age of these performers and is consistent with a competitive market. Artists 
with the highest revenue per show in 1996-’99 include the Eagles, Barbra Streisand, Jimmy 
Buffet, Eric Clapton, and Rod Stewart. All of these artists had reached middle age by the mid-
1990s. It is possible age has increased their marginal cost of performing, resulting in a reduction 
in the profit-maximizing number of concerts per year.
13 
 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
  Although, in media markets, a few firms may produce most of the output, and earn a 
large percentage of the revenue and profit, these results require imperfect substitution between 
goods with different qualities, and marginal cost low and possibly declining in output. However, 
not all markets have such conditions, but they still may exhibit at least some of the 
characteristics of superstar markets. One example, considered in some detail herein because of   18
the availability of data, is the market for rock concerts. In that market, no seller produces a 
significant fraction of total output, but a few sellers claim a large percentage of market revenue. 
  Additionally, following Rosen [1981], an interesting feature of the typical superstar 
model has been the idea small quality differences can lead to large differences in earnings. 
However, as Adler [2006] argued, small quality differences between sellers when marginal and 
average cost decline with output will result in price being competed towards average cost, 
implying one superstar may remain and sell a large percentage of market output but will not earn 
significant economic profit. Large quality differences may be necessary for sellers to earn 
positive profit---just as in the model derived herein. However, large quality differences in the 
Rosen model imply a lack of competition. Thus, the model herein can explain why some firms 
earn significant positive profit---while others earn zero profit---without imperfect substitution 
between products, marginal cost declining in output, or monopoly.   
  Finally, Frank and Cook [1992] refer to markets with superstar effects as “winner-take-all 
markets.” They suggest such effects result from indivisibilities---e.g. two tennis players can not 
work together to win a singles title---and rank-order contests in which payoffs do not depend on 
absolute quality. They conclude such markets have too many resources allocated to them due to 
rent-seeking by market participants. In the model herein, no rent-seeking occurs and the market 
is competitive. This suggests one should not conclude the equilibrium in all markets with 
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 NOTES 
 
1Among the non-rock artists are country performers (George Strait and Reba McEntire), a pop singer (Barbra Streisand), and an 
opera singer (Luciano Pavarotti). 
2 Rosen, 1981, p. 849. 
3 Cost increases in market size because it is more expensive to reach a larger audience in a given concert, but, more importantly, 
the large decline in quality as the audience at a concert grows necessitates more concerts to reach additional customers. 
4 Rosen [1981] briefly considered a case similar to that herein in which technology is such a few producers could not profitably 
sell a large percentage of market output; he found superstar effects in that case. However, Rosen spent little time on that situation, 
and focused mainly on the case with joint consumption. 
5 Rosen [1981] compared the model in his 1981 paper on superstars to the model in his paper on hedonic prices [Rosen, 1974]. In 
his earlier paper, Rosen assumed arbitrage was not possible. In the case of hedonic prices, a good may have many attributes, one 
bundle of attributes may not be comparable to another, and thus it seems reasonable to assume arbitrage does not occur. 
However, in Rosen’s superstar model (as in the model herein), quality is one-dimensional, with all consumers valuing quality 
identically. In this case, there is no reason why arbitrage between different quality levels should not occur. 
6 In one sense, the problem is like that for an irrational consumer, one who is completely random and consumes goods that are 
not perfect substitutes. On average, such a consumer would be at the mid point of his budget constraint [Becker, 1962]. In that 
problem, a small change in one price would result in a small change in quantity consumed of the different goods. Thus, the 
demand for particular goods could be derived. With perfect substitutes, starting with a set of prices such that arbitrage occurs, a 
small change in the price of one type of the good will lead to a corner solution for that good: if pi rises slightly, yi = 0, and, if pi 
falls slightly, only the good with quality zi will be purchased. 
7 Stars will earn positive profit in this model, so one with z > z0 could charge a price slightly below P(z) = 
0 z
z P0, still earn 
positive profit, and induce buyers to strictly prefer buying an item with z > z0. Non-stars earn zero profit.  
8 The decrease in supply must be larger than the increase in demand for P(  ) to increase proportionally more than    does. 
Otherwise, we would continue to have P(z0) < P0, and, ultimately, no non-stars would  be in the market. 
9 Since     has been reduced, it is possible the decrease in P(  ) would be small enough so P(z0) > P0. Non-stars would earn 
positive profit, more of them would enter the market, demand would decrease due to the further reduction in , z  and P(  )) would 
fall until P(z0) = P0. Assume appropriate shapes for demand and supply, so the equilibrium does not result in a corner solution in 
which     is driven to z0 as supply increases and demand decreases continue to lead to P(z0) > P0.   
10 In long run equilibrium,    is derived from the sellers active in the market. Market demand eq.(19) makes use of the    that 
reflects active sellers (eq.(18)). 
11 Contrast Example Two, where the top 4 firms sell about 30% of market output with the market for fiction books (Section One) 
where the top 4 sell 70% of market output. The dominance of a few fiction writers is due to low and possibly constant marginal 
cost in this “media market.” 
12 Krueger [2005] considered what happened to those who were the top revenue earners in the period 1996-’99. From the period 
1994-’95 (before concert prices began to increase significantly [1997]) to the period 2000-’01, the number of shows performed 
by these individuals or groups fell by 18%, and revenue per show increased by 60%. 
13 Age may also used to explain results consistent with monopoly. The audience for older performers tends to be older and 
wealthier, and may have less elastic demand than consumers for other musical groups, implying a higher price for older 
performers.  
14 Superstar markets in sports differ from what we have considered because the individual is the superstar. In this case, an 
inefficient result may occur because of an externality---other teams reap some of the gains from a superstar in attendance and 
television revenue. Hausman and Leonard [1997] found a significant superstar externality in the National Basketball Association. 




We now consider whether revenue, given the profit-maximizing q, is necessarily convex in 
quality (z) if total cost (C) increases with z at a decreasing rate---the result found in the text for 
the case when C = z
q
 + F, with q = firm output and  > 1. Since it is the effect of z on C when 
C is not an explicit function of z that is of interest, and the effect of q on C is not of interest, use  





(A1) C  = q




     cz > 0. Let czz    
   
    . With R = kzq and k a positive constant, the first-order 
condition for the profit maximizing choice of q is: 
 
(A2) q * = kz/2c.                                                                                                                                                       
 
 Substituting  into  R using eq.(A2) yields R* = k
2z
2/2c. To get rid of constant terms, let  
r   2R*/k
2  = z





    = 
 
   2        .                                                                                                                                         
 
  In order for R* to be positively related to z, 
  
   must be positive, so 2c > zcz, or, with c,z 
the elasticity of c with respect to z, c,z < 2. Since the elasticity of C with respect to q is 2, and the 
elasticities of c and C with respect to z are identical, the condition c,z < 2 requires z to have a 
smaller impact on C than does q. Differentiating  z
r

  with respect to z: 
 
(A4) 
   
     = 
 
   2           
    
   2                                                                                                             
 
  The first term in brackets in eq.(A4) is positive, and, for 
  
   > 0, the third term in brackets 
is negative. Thus, c increasing with z at a decreasing rate---czz < 0----is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for revenue to increase at an increasing rate with z, that is for 
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